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Abstract
RNA viruses, with their high potential for mutation and epidemic spread, are the most common 
class of pathogens found as new causes of human illness. Despite great advances made in 
diagnostic technology since the 1950s, the annual rate at which novel virulent viruses have been 
found has remained at 2–3. Most emerging viruses are zoonoses; they have jumped from mammal 
or bird hosts to humans. An analysis of virus discovery indicates that the small number of novel 
viruses discovered annually is an artifact of inadequate surveillance in tropical and subtropical 
countries, where even established endemic pathogens are often misdiagnosed. Many of the 
emerging viruses of the future are already infecting humans but remain to be uncovered by a 
strategy of disease surveillance in selected populations.
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Introduction
In common with all organisms, pathogens evolve. Every year brings reports of previously 
unrecognized human pathogens or of pathogens extending their geographic range, becoming 
less susceptible to treatment or prevention, or displaying unprecedented epidemic 
tendencies. As I write this an unprecedented Ebola virus epidemic threatens West Africa [1] 
and chikungunya, a mosquito-borne virus, which first appeared in the Western Hemisphere 
in November 2013, has already infected nearly 1,000,000 people there [2]. For those of us 
with responsibility for preventing or controlling infectious diseases, the speed with which 
new battles must be fought can be disconcerting. Zaire Ebola virus was first identified as a 
human pathogen only in 1977 and chikungunya in 1956 but neither reached pandemic 
magnitude until decades later. How can we be better prepared to identify emerging 
pathogens early? I will try to briefly examine some of the factors that influence our success 
in finding and characterizing previously unrecognized human viruses.
The concept of emerging diseases is relatively recent [3], even if the phenomenon is not. 
The definition used by the World Health Organization [4] is representative: “An emerging 
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disease is one that has appeared in a population for the first time or that may have existed 
previously but is rapidly increasing in incidence or geographic range”. In practice, 
determining if a disease is increasing in incidence or geographic range sometimes requires 
interpretation that might be considered arbitrary. For example, using this broad definition a 
recent paper [5] claimed to have identified about 400 emergent “events” between 1940 and 
2012, most of which were examples of antimicrobial resistance. A more limited and less 
ambiguous subset of emerging pathogens will be described here: virus species first 
recognized to cause human illness.
Three recently discovered human pathogens
Before proceeding, it might be worth describing how three recently described pathogens 
were discovered and their disease characteristics. All three were first reported during the last 
six years and all three are generally accepted as distinct pathogenic entities causing serious 
human illness.
Lujo virus
In early September 2008, a 36-year-old female resident of Lusaka, Zambia developed 
fulminant symptoms of an acute infection, beginning with headache and myalgia, and 
progressing over the next 10 days to extensive rash, facial swelling and severe sore throat [6, 
7]. By the time she was airlifted to a hospital at Johannesburg, South Africa, she had 
developed cerebral edema, acute respiratory distress, and renal failure. Despite intensive 
care, including hemodialysis, she died 14 days after her initial symptoms. Five of those who 
cared for her during transport to South Africa or at the Johannesburg hospital—a paramedic, 
two nurses and a cleaner — subsequently developed symptoms and four of these died. A 
previously undescribed arenavirus, lujo virus (a conflation of Lusaka and Johannesburg) was 
isolated from the index case and all four secondary cases [6]. The arenaviruses, which have 
bisegmented, single-stranded, negative-sense RNA genomes, are broadly divided 
phylogenetically into New World and Old World groups. Lujo belongs to the Old World 
group, as does Lassa virus. Typically arenaviruses have rodent reservoirs but the specific 
host for lujo virus has yet to be determined and how the index case was infected is unknown 
[7]. There have been no further cases reported.
Heartland virus
During summer, 2009, two men, aged 57 and 67 years, were admitted within a few weeks of 
each other to Heartland Regional Medical Center, St. Joseph, Missouri, USA, with similar 
symptoms of fever, fatigue, anorexia, nausea and non-bloody diarrhea. The two men were 
farmers who lived approximately 100 km distant from each other in northwestern Missouri. 
Both men had histories of frequent tick bite and were initially suspected to be infected with 
Ehrlichia chaffeensis, a tick-borne rickettsia endemic to the area. Serological and molecular 
testing of both, however, were negative for Ehrlichia and neither responded to antibiotics. 
While in hospital both men developed precipitous thrombocytopenia and leukopenia. 
Symptoms resolved with supportive care and both men were released from hospital 10 and 
12 days after admission. Culture of specimens indicated the presence of virus, which was 
confirmed by electron microscopy, and subsequently a unique bunyavirus, in the group 
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phlebovirus, was sequenced from both patients [8]. Phleboviruses are single-stranded, 
negative-sense RNA viruses with tripartite genomes, all of which appear to be transmitted 
by biting arthropods. Heartland virus is the first pathogenic phlebovirus described from the 
Western Hemisphere and has a 75 % nucleotide homology with the severe fever with 
thrombocytopenia syndrome (SFTS) virus, reported from China in 2011 [9]. Heartland virus 
has since been isolated from ticks and antibodies to it have been found in a variety of wild 
animals, including white-tailed deer (Odocoileus virginianus) and raccoons (Procyon lotor) 
[10]. There is no evidence for direct human to human transmission of Heartland although a 
number of mostly nosocomial cases have been reported for SFTS.
MERS-CoV
Between April, 2012 and late July, 2014, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus 
(MERS-CoV) was definitively diagnosed in 837 people, 291 of whom died [11]. The focus 
of cases has been in Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and other Middle Eastern 
countries; the few cases detected in Europe and North Africa appear to be travelers from the 
Middle East. The index case was a 60-year-old male admitted to hospital at Jeddah, Saudi 
Arabia in June 2012 with a recent history of fever, cough and shortness of breath [12]. At 
the time of admission his laboratory blood results were generally unexceptional but by 10 
days post-admission his white blood cell count had increased to 23,800/cu mm and his 
platelets fallen to 78,000. Antibiotic-sensitive strains of Klebsiella pneumoniae and 
Staphylococcus aureus were cultured from his respiratory tract but he did not respond to 
antibiotic therapy. Despite being on intensive support from the second day of admission, the 
patient died 11 days post-admission of respiratory deterioration and renal failure. 
Coronaviruses, which include severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV) 
and some agents of the common cold, have positive-sense, single-stranded RNA genomes 
and are predominately transmitted between humans by fomites. Many of the MERS-CoV 
cases have been nosocomial or appear to have been transmitted within families. Neutralizing 
antibodies to MERS-CoV have been widely found in dromedary camels [Camelus 
dromedarius] from the Arabian peninsula and Africa [13] and virus has been isolated from 
them, strengthening the evidence that they are the immediate link to emergence in humans.
Despite the differences in clinical presentation and geographical location, these three 
pathogens share three characteristics: all were unknown before found infecting humans, all 
are RNA viruses, and all have proven or putative non-human, animal sources.
Animal RNA viruses are the most common source of emerging pathogens
In a seminal study, Woolhouse et al. [14] tabulated 87 pathogens first reported to be 
pathogenic to humans during 1980–2005. Two-thirds of these were viruses, 85 % of which 
had single-stranded RNA (ssRNA) genomes. The predominance of RNA viruses mostly 
owes to two characteristics. First, the rate of error during RNA replication (~ 10−4) is an 
order of magnitude greater than that of DNA (~ 10−5). RNA replication does not benefit 
from the proofreading capabilities of DNA polymerase or post-replication mismatch repair; 
consequently the potential for mutation per replication cycle is high [15] and the lack of 
fidelity may have limited the size of RNA genomes, many of which are in the range of 
10,000–15,000 nucleotides. Second, most RNA viruses are zoonoses, that is, they were 
Rosenberg Page 3













transmitted, at least initially, to humans from non-human mammal or avian hosts. Examples 
of RNA viruses retaining the capacity to be directly transmitted from animals to humans 
include influenza, Nipa, and SARS viruses, but even some viruses commonly transmitted 
exclusively between humans, such as HIV and hepatitis C, have likely animal origins [16]. 
All arthropod-borne viruses (arboviruses) are zoonoses, although some, like dengue, yellow 
fever, and chikungunya, have adapted to efficient vectorborne transmission between 
humans. Humans have been in contact with infectious animals since prehistory but their 
exposure accelerated with the development of livestock husbandry beginning about 15,000 
years ago [17]. The growing global population has not only increased the demand for 
domesticated meat in the 21st C but has increased encroachment on areas once wild, both 
are trends that increase human exposure to animals and animal products [18].
The rate of virus discovery
By the end of 2010, there had been, by one tabulation [19], 213 virus species from 25 virus 
families incriminated as causes of human disease. More than two-thirds of these viruses (68 
%) are known or presumed zoonoses. More than a quarter (28 %) were first described from 
non-human mammals, birds or blood-feeding arthropods 1–77 years before being recognized 
as human pathogens. Indeed, the first vertebrate virus described, the cause of foot and mouth 
disease, was isolated from a cow in 1897 [20] but conclusively shown to cause human 
disease only in 1954 [21]. The dates of discovery, regardless of host, are plotted in Fig. 1a. 
The rate at which virulent viruses have been discovered has been governed by two equally 
important factors: the ability of existing technology to detect and discriminate between 
viruses, and the ability to collect specimens potentially containing novel viruses.
Initially, the lack of methods for the laboratory cultivation of viruses, which require cells for 
replication, prevented their isolation for study. Early characterization as a virus depended 
mainly on demonstration that a filterable agent smaller than bacteria was responsible for 
transmissible disease. Until the late-1930s, when embryonated chicken eggs and suckling 
mice began to be used commonly to culture animal viruses, only 26 of the viruses now 
known to be pathogenic had been described. The rate of discovery again accelerated after 
the introduction of in vitro cell culture in 1949 (Fig. 1a). The mean annual rate of virus 
discovery during 1950–1959 was 3.3. During this period methods for antigentically typing 
viruses using panels of antibodies were refined and came into wide use. There was a striking 
increase in the number of novel viruses described during 1960–1969 to 4.9/year. This was 
followed, however, by a sudden deceleration in the rate of discovery to only about 2/year, 
which persisted through 2010, despite the availability of increasingly powerful methods for 
genomic characterization, such as polymerase chain reaction (PCR) from the mid-1980s and, 
more recently, high-throughput, parallelized (“next-generation”) sequencing.
Vertebrate viruses can be sorted into two broad categories: those directly transmissible 
between humans or between animals and humans, and the arboviruses, which require the 
mediation of blood-feeding arthropod vectors, such as mosquitoes or ticks; 39 % (83) of 
pathogenic viruses are transmitted to humans only by arthropod vectors. The sudden, 
transitory increase in rate during 1960–1969 has been shown [19] to be because the rates of 
discovery of these two classes differed (Fig. 1b). Before 1950 the rates for the two were the 
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same and each comprised about half the pathogenic viruses. After 1950, however, the trends 
of the two classes of virus diverged. While about two non-arboviruses were discovered each 
year between 1950 and 2010, the arboviruses dramatically increased during 1960–1969, 
only to fall equally dramatically to nearly zero by 1980. During 1960–1969 twice as many 
arboviruses (32) were discovered than non-arboviruses (15); by contrast, during 1981–2010, 
only 2 arboviruses were discovered compared to 57 non-arboviruses. The difference in the 
rates for the two classes highlights the important role that strategies for specimen collection 
play in the recognition of novel pathogens [19].
The Rockefeller Foundation as “big hitter”
The efflorescence of arbovirus discovery during 1960–1969 coincided with activities at 
tropical field research stations sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation (RF). During its 
investigations on yellow fever during 1916–1940 the RF had circumstantially discovered 
several novel arboviruses, including West Nile virus. In 1951 it began a 15-year program of 
arbovirus research in Brazil, Trinidad, Colombia, Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt and India 
[22]. All the field stations were located in tropical or sub-tropical countries and all carried 
out an integrated strategy that attempted to discover viruses from humans, vertebrate 
animals and biting arthropods. Of the 83 arboviruses discovered by the end of 2010, 35 (42 
%) were discovered by RF staff, 23 of those during 1951–1969. In comparison, the single 
most successful institutional discoverer of non-arboviruses, the United States National 
Institutes of Health, described 12 of 130 (9 %). The RF protocol, which was the model for 
several other institutions, including the Institut Pasteur, was directly responsible for two 
additional characteristics differentiating arbovirus from non-arbovirus discovery. Although 
68 % of all non-arboviruses were discovered in Europe or the USA, 67 % of all arboviruses 
were discovered in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America/Caribbean, or Egypt/India/ Near East 
(Fig. 2). Second, 33 % of arboviruses were first isolated from arthropods, a consequence of 
systematic vector collections. The predetermined cessation, by 1970, of most RF support for 
international arbovirus research— including sponsorship of reference collections, 
conferences, new technology and reagents—was soon followed by a rapid, worldwide 
decline in arbovirus discovery (Fig. 1b). The East African Virus Research Institute, for 
example, which was founded by RF in 1935, isolated 5 arboviruses after direct RF 
administration ended in 1952, but none after the general RF program closed in 1965.
The disproportionate productivity of RF resembles that of especially effective individual 
discoverers of plant species [23]. Those botanical “big hitters” combined technical expertise 
and persistence over many years with concentration in a limited geographic area where they 
had gained deep knowledge. The RF was committed to a long-term strategy founded on five 
components. First, it chose study sites where it had evidence that arbovirus diversity would 
be high. These were mostly tropical and contained forested and rural areas. They chose 
countries where a professional work force could be recruited and where it was hoped the 
work would be sustained after the RF departed. Second, the program concentrated only on 
one subclass of pathogens, the arboviruses. Despite the wide competence of the professional 
staff, few reports were published dealing with local diseases other than arboviral. Third, the 
research strategy called for long-term commitment. RF staff, including expatriates, typically 
lived on site and implemented projects for years, allowing for continuity of not only research 
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but training. Fourth, the program was integrative. Human, animal and vector investigations 
were simultaneously pursued. Because all scientists worked in a single unit connections 
between human virus isolates and those from animals or vectors were readily made. On the 
other hand, for many viruses isolated from animals or arthropods there has yet to be a link to 
human infection [24]. And fifth, each unit was self-contained. Each was capable of 
conducting both specimen collection and sophisticated laboratory analyses.
How many pathogenic viruses remain to be discovered?
Mathematical methods for extrapolating from historical rates of discovery to estimate the 
pool of yet to be discovered organisms in a given taxon tend to be accurate only after most 
species have already been discovered [25]. The fundamental weakness of these 
computations, which generally rely on analysis of cumulative frequency curves, is the 
assumption that the numbers of organisms known at a given time are the result of methods 
of discovery that have been consistent everyplace and throughout time. The increased rate of 
virus discovery during 1955–1970 was largely due to the temporary efforts of the RF, a “big 
hitter” [23], whose combination of active surveillance, geographic specialization, and 
integrated approach remains atypical.
In contrast to sophisticated computations, a recently published prediction that a minimum of 
320,000 mammalian viruses of 9 families remain to be discovered was based on a simple 
arithmetical calculation using data from a single study [26]. Considering how few new, 
virulent viruses are found every year, the potential for any of 320,000 viruses jumping to 
humans and being discovered would then be very low (6.25 9 10−6). The authors used 
degenerate, virus-family-level primers to amplify genomic segments from specimens of 
feces, urine, and throat swabs collected from the bat species Pteropus giganteus in 
Bangladesh. Amplicons were as short as 250 bp and no biological information was obtained. 
They found 55 viruses (and statistically surmised an additional three existed), some of which 
might be novel, belonging to seven virus families. In calculating a number for the universe 
of viruses yet to be found they speculated that each of the known 5,486 mammal species will 
host an average 58 unique viruses, unshared with other species. The authors concede that 
there is little evidence to support these presumptions. A single subtropical bat species hardly 
represents all mammal species and indeed many viruses are known to infect more than one 
species; they tested for only 9 of the 25 virus families pathogenic to humans. Ultimately, the 
number of viruses remaining to be discovered is irrelevant if, as expected, there are many 
and they continue to rapidly evolve.
Predicting emergent potential
The discovery of a virus can long predate its emergence as a recognized public health threat. 
The discovery of Zika virus in a monkey in Uganda preceded its first incrimination as the 
cause of a human epidemic—12,000 km distant in Micronesia—by 70 years [27]. As noted 
above, the availability of ever more powerful molecular techniques is substantially 
increasing the catalog of distinct viruses found in nature but the number found annually to 
be pathogenic to humans rarely exceeds a few each year. Is it feasible to predict which 
animal viruses have the potential to cause disease in humans?
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The steps by which a virus might emerge from exclusively animal hosts are schematically 
depicted in Fig. 3. At the most preliminary level (Tier 1) viruses circulate within mammals 
and birds, not necessarily causing disease, before some opportunistically infect humans (Tier 
2). Typical human-animal contact includes husbandry, capture of wild animals for food, and 
exposure to animal fomites or waste, as may happen in bat infested environments. Indirect 
exposure via arthropods must be frequent, as evidenced by the large proportion of 
pathogenic viruses that are vectorborne [19]. In most instances these Tier 2, opportunistic 
infections are dead ends or remain rare events because the pathogen is not well adapted to 
transmission between humans (e.g., Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus) or because the 
type of contact between infected animals and humans is uncommon (e.g., sealpox virus). A 
small but significant group of zoonotic viruses, including Rift Valley fever, Nipah and West 
Nile viruses, are capable of instigating human epidemics without ever adapting to human– 
human transmission.
Theoretically even sub-epidemic (Ro < 1) transmission can favor mutations that will enhance 
future transmission [28]. In rare instances (Tier 3) pathogens do evolve to allow human–
human transmission (e.g., HIV) or appear to already posses that capacity (e.g., MERS-CoV, 
lujo). Some viruses maintain animal–animal and animal-human cycles but are mostly 
propagated by human–human transmission (e.g., chikungunya, Zika). The geographically 
limited sylvatic cycles of dengue in West Africa and Southeast Asia account for a tiny 
percentage of the estimated 390 million infections annually [29].
Biological determinants
Human contact with an animal virus does not ensure infection. Among the biological 
barriers for the virus are finding a route of entry, evading general immune defenses, 
invading host cells, replicating sufficient numbers before specific immune responses are 
mounted, and finding a route to the next host. Aerosol delivery, for example, greatly 
enhances transmissibility but efficiency depends on the anatomical site within the 
respiratory system of the invaded cells [30, 31]. Arbovirus transmission, in which the vector 
amplifies, transports and inoculates the virus into humans, can be enhanced by viral 
mutations that increase the potential for successfully infecting the vector [32, 33] or animal 
host [34] without altering its virulence to humans. Much recent research has focused on 
identifying determinants essential for viral invasion of host cells and how modification of 
the viral ligands might increase their ability for interspecies infectivity [34].
It is not yet possible on the evidence of sequence alone to predict with confidence the 
probability of an animal virus transitioning to humans. In general, vertebrate specificity 
greatly limits the ability of viruses adapted to one species to invade similar cells in another, 
distant species. Influenza A is the most studied and best understood of the few viruses that 
frequently jump from animals to humans. A number of mutations have been identified that 
enhance infectivity. These include substitutions in the hemagglutinin (HA) protein receptor 
binding sites that enable the virus to exploit sialylated glycan receptors on respiratory cells 
belonging to other species [35]. For example, two non-synonymous base changes in the HA 
receptor binding sites of avian H2 and H3 viruses, which converted their specificity from the 
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avian α2,3-SA to human α2,6-SA, led to the 1957 pandemic of H2N2 and the 1968 
pandemic of H3N2 [36]. Much current research on the determinants of influenza specificity 
is experimental and its extension to complex natural transmission of other virus families 
remains to be tested. Understanding how such adaptability works could focus our attention 
on those virus families or species with the greatest chance of infecting humans but how this 
knowledge could be used more specifically to identify potential threats to humans among 
animal viruses, as has recently been proposed [5], is unclear.
Geographical bias, human behavior and likelihood of contact
Species richness of mammals and birds is greatest at the equator, thinning toward the poles 
[37]; mosquitoes [38] and ticks [39] appear to follow a similar latitudinal species diversity 
gradient. Pathogen species are also richer in the tropics than in temperate zones [40] 
although, as has been ruefully pointed out, “The fact that warbler species distributions are 
better understood than the distribution of human pathogens is a gap that clearly deserves 
research attention” [41]. There is a strong association between mammal and pathogen 
richness but mammal diversity appears to be an indicator rather than the cause of pathogen 
diversity [41]. Pathogens that maintain external life cycles, for example vector-borne and 
helminthic, which are directly susceptible to variability in precipitation, tend to be more 
geographically restricted to the tropics than those directly transmissible between people, 
such as influenza [40]. Environmental barriers to dispersion can be circumvented. 
Monkeypox virus, whose natural transmission is largely restricted to parts of equatorial 
Africa by the range of its natural rodent hosts, has demonstrated the ability to make use of 
new hosts in temperate zones [42] and a number of arboviruses, such as chikungunya, 
dengue and Zika viruses, have widely expanded their natural ranges as their principal 
vectors have [43]. The RF selection of field sites in 1950 was based on the relatively greater 
diversity of arboviruses found during the preceding 35 years in tropical countries and it can 
be argued that their success in discovering new viruses owed as much to this factor as their 
choice of integrated, active surveillance. As would be expected, there appears to be a 
correlation between zones of species richness and frequency of reported vector-borne and 
zoonotic emerging disease events [44].
The species richness of the tropics suggests that human populations there are exposed to 
greater risk and that they are fertile grounds for virus mutation. Certain behaviors common 
to some regions, such as the harvesting of wild animals for food, aggravate that risk. The 
lack of housing barriers to rodents, bats and arthropod vectors are major vulnerabilities to 
pathogens carried by them. Environmental and sanitation deficiencies also increase risk to 
enteric and vector-borne viruses; in the absence of dependable water supply, many people, 
for example, are forced to store containers of water that provide breeding for the virus-
carrying mosquitoes. Most importantly, as Dunn et al. [41] have shown, countries with the 
highest pathogen richness spend the least per capita on health care, and there is an inverse 
correlation between investment in public health and pathogen prevalence, independent of 
species richness.
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Because of the obvious link between the abundance of novel viruses and the tropics, 
geospatial modeling could help target areas for surveillance. There is a tradition of 
developing and using models to identify those areas of the world whose species richness is 
most in need of conservation [37, 45] and recently attempts have been made to use models 
to identify areas most liable to spawn emerging diseases [5, 44]. Considering the association 
between mammal and pathogen species richness there can be expected to be some overlap 
between the two sets of “hot spots”. The predictive robustness of a model depends not only 
on the algorithms used but in the choice and weighting of variables, and the 
representativeness and validity of the data. For example, a widely cited model [5, 44], which 
chooses “the original case or cluster of cases representing an infectious disease emerging 
(during 1940–2004) in human populations for the first time”, lists only 61 of 168 viruses 
first described as infecting humans during that period [19]. On the other hand it credits the 
first occurrence of a number of viruses described years earlier to the period 1940–2004; 
these include measles, influenza A, and rabies, assigning to each a single, arbitrary 
origination location (US, Hong Kong, and Costa Rica, respectively) for modeling geospatial 
associations. Because this model also lumps a variety of emerging disease types, including 
many examples of antimicrobial resistance, population density is a major factor, which 
might explain the higher likelihood for emergent events it assigns to India and Java than to 
the Amazon or equatorial Africa, where so many novel viruses have been discovered.
Modeling has been more successful for single pathogens for which large amounts of specific 
data have been collected, such as for dengue [46] or malaria [47]. Associating disease 
prevalence in a limited area with well-characterized environmental attributes, as has been 
done for plague bacteria (Yersinia pestis) in Uganda, can be used to predict areas potentially 
at risk that would be difficult to collect data from, such as large plagueprone tracts of the 
neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo [48]. Because many of the arbovirus species are 
known only from places where long-term field operations were established by the RF, 
Institut Pasteur, and others, and because those sites were selected for logistical and political 
realities as well as scientific interest, their usefulness in modeling is still limited.
Surveillance for emerging pathogens: the problem of knowing the unknown
Human surveillance
Successful surveillance depends on how and where one looks. Ideally, an emerging virus 
will be detected at its source and contained before spreading. This ideal requires, however, 
extensive networks of alert health care providers, adequate laboratory resources, and an 
effective method for communicating results to an authority capable of responding. It also 
assumes that a zoonotic virus will not be spread by animal hosts impossible to control, as 
was the case with the avian arbovirus, West Nile.
In practice, human disease surveillance raises an alarm only after an arbitrary number of 
seemingly related, serious cases are reported and arouse attention. Generally, number of 
cases and length of time to detection are least for anticipated pathogens with distinct 
presentations, such as poliovirus presenting with acute flaccid paralysis. In countries with 
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rudimentary public health systems that threshold might be reached for unexpected pathogens 
only after the number of cases reaches epidemic proportions impossible to ignore, as the 
recent epidemic of Ebola virus in West Africa demonstrates. Many viral disease cases 
present as clinically indistinguishable acute febrile illnesses (AFI) or with symptoms so mild 
the patient does not seek attention. Cases with neurological involvement or systemic 
bleeding can also be difficult to diagnose clinically without adequate laboratory support. In 
those tropical areas most likely to spawn emerging viruses, AFI will be misdiagnosed or 
undiagnosed in at least 50 % of patients [49–52]. Overlooking novel pathogens as the cause 
of nonspecific symptoms is not confined to developing countries: it is likely Heartland virus 
was a cause of illness in the USA long before it was characterized in 2012. Nevertheless, the 
probability that more undescribed viruses infect humans in the tropics seems to be greater. It 
is likely, therefore, that many emerging diseases due to novel viruses will be overlooked, 
especially at Tier 2, until they become epidemic, are transported to countries with more 
sensitive surveillance, or are discovered by chance.
Laboratory support for clinicians is critically deficient nearly everywhere in the rural tropics. 
The first step in determining if an illness might be caused by a rare or unknown virus is to 
eliminate the possibility of pathogens known to be endemic. Simple, relatively accurate 
rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs) are available for a few common causes of AFI, notably 
malaria, but tests for most viruses require not only equipment, such as ELISA readers, but 
modest, dependable infrastructural support—electric power, clean water, cold storage—
rarely available outside major cities. Poor roads often make the timely, proper transport of 
specimens to centers with laboratory capacity impractical. Even in cities, many hospitals and 
government laboratories do not have the basic equipment, fresh reagents or accurate testing 
protocols to assay for most common endemic pathogens.
Should laboratory capability be available to eliminate most known etiologies for the disease 
observed, description of a novel pathogen typically requires both biological and molecular 
characterization [53]. Recovery of viable virus for culture and histological evidence of 
pathology remain fundamental steps establishing causality. The increasing power and 
availability of rapid, next-generation sequencing has made whole-genome analysis an 
increasingly routine and important part of describing novel viruses but because of the large 
number of commensal species found in the human virome [54], linking a novel genome with 
virulence will be tentative without supporting biological evidence. For example, WU and KI 
polyomaviruses, isolated in the mid-2000s from children suffering from acute respiratory 
infections and tentatively included in the list of human pathogens [19], have yet to be proven 
causal of illness [55].
Our ability to detect and characterize novel pathogenic viruses in hot spot locations lags 
behind global systems that have arisen to report and respond to unusual occurrences. The 
International Health Regulations (IHR) of the World Health Organization (WHO) binds 196 
countries to plans to improve their ability to detect and respond to outbreaks, and the Global 
Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN) of WHO helps organize international 
response to public health emergencies. Open source networks for reporting outbreaks 
include the Program for Monitoring Emerging Diseases (ProMED-mail), a free, internet-
based system for disseminating information posted by 40,000 professional contributors in 
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185 countries, and HealthMap, which collects and continuously updates disease outbreak 
data from a variety of public sources, including news services. Many of these reports seem 
never to be investigated or resolved. The full value of these systems can only be attained if 
provided with accurate information.
Animal surveillance
Considering the barriers to obtaining human surveillance data, it has been proposed [5] that 
monitoring animal populations at sentinel locations could alert us to risk from viruses with 
pandemic potential. For such a plan to be feasible for emerging viruses it would be 
necessary to judge the potential risk posed by a virus not yet known to infect humans. 
Epizootic disease in livestock or wild animals is used as a threat indicator for some known 
zoonotic viruses, such as influenza, Rift Valley Fever virus, and West Nile virus, but there is 
no assurance that an agent potentially pathogenic to humans will cause noticeable disease in 
animal hosts. Coronaviruses closely related and putatively ancestral to SARS virus, for 
example, seem not to cause disease in host bats [56]. The extent of animal disease 
surveillance is also far less in the tropics than even the poorest human clinical networks so 
the likelihood of recognizing an unusual event is less. Periodic sampling of animals can 
discover novel viruses but is too infrequent and limited to be surveillance. Considerable 
attention has been given to human contact with bush meat, or animals captured for food [5]. 
While harvesting and slaughtering wild animals appear to have provided the mechanism by 
which some important pathogens have emerged, such as HIV and SARS, it has not played a 
role in the emergence of many others, including the three examples discussed in this paper: 
lujo, Heartland and MERS-CoV. Vectors obviate the need of direct human-mammal or 
human-bird contact and can move viruses across ecological zones. Sequencing and 
cataloging the viruses of animals in selected areas can provide valuable insight to 
transmission dynamics and phylogenetics but, as discussed, cannot yet be used to predict. 
One must wonder if the US $6.3 billion proposed to catalog mammalian viruses not yet 
known to be pernicious [26] would not be better spent on developing more suitable 
diagnostic tests for humans in remote areas most liable to emerging pathogen risk or on 
conducting sentinel human surveillance. Ultimately, the best indication that a pathogen has 
the ability to jump to humans is finding it in humans [57].
Integrated surveillance at sentinel sites
Although there is not a strong rationale for conducting autonomous searches for potentially 
pathogenic viruses in animal populations, there is much value in animal investigations in 
support of surveillance for infectious diseases in selected, sentinel human populations. The 
discovery of lujo virus in a human, for example, should direct our attention to its 
epidemiology and ecology in the area where we suspect exposure occurred. Had lujo been 
discovered in an animal instead, its significance as a pathogen would have been speculative 
until the detection of the first human case. The integrative, long-term approach of the RF can 
serve as a model but with primary focus on conducting population-based surveillance for 
acute illness. Concomitant ecological profiling and virological studies in arthropods, 
mammals and birds can more quickly clarify the epidemiology of any novel viruses 
discovered in the human population.
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The zoonotic viruses pathogenic to humans represent a small but unknown proportion of 
those infecting mammals and birds. From this constantly evolving universe of vertebrate 
viruses two or three are recognized every year to have broken the species barrier, a 
remarkably small number considering the frequent contact between humans and animals, 
and the high adaptability of RNA viruses. While most of these novel, emergent viruses have 
inconsequential public health significance, some, such as MERS-CoV or lujo, have obvious 
destructive potential. What is the best strategy for identifying and limiting the menace from 
novel, zoonotic viruses? Identifying potential pathogens before they leap to humans (Tier 1) 
would seem ideal but is impractical. The determinants of pathogenicity are complex and 
poorly understood, while a system for wildlife or livestock surveillance in those areas with 
conditions most conducive to emergence cannot anytime soon reach a scale or effectiveness 
to be pragmatic.
It is likely that yet to be recognized viruses already infecting humans will be sources of 
disease outbreaks of varying magnitude in the future. These Tier 2 infections can be 
uncovered as part of comprehensive, investigative surveillance in human populations at risk. 
In the near term this would be best accomplished in most places through specially designed 
sentinel surveillance sites. Modeling might at some point provide guidance for site selection 
but too narrow a definition for target sites (e.g., bush meat markets) will be self-defeating. 
By identifying and eliminating poorly appreciated endemic agents, investigations can then 
focus on illnesses with unresolved etiologies. Unlike investigations directed at animal 
populations there would be a tangible, immediate improvement in the health of the subject 
communities. Complimentary studies of vectors and animals, as pioneered by the 
Rockefeller Foundation, would prepare for epidemiological investigations of those zoonoses 
uncovered but the primary focus must be on humans. Ultimately, one hopes, surveillance for 
emerging zoonoses will be a part of improved health care systems throughout the world.
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a The cumulative number of viruses discovered annually. The discovery date might precede 
the incrimination of the virus as a cause of human disease, as known by 2010. b Comparison 
of the cumulative rate of discovery of arboviruses and non-arboviruses
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Comparison of regions in which arboviruses and non-arboviruses were discovered
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Schematic of the emergence of zoonotic viruses as human pathogens. In Tier 1, viruses are 
only transmitted among sub-human animals. In Tier 2, viruses infect humans, but only 
directly from animals. Some animal viruses (solid arrows), like West Nile, can fuel zoonotic 
epidemics. Others, like hantaviruses, are frequent but sub-epidemic causes of human illness 
(dashed black arrows), while many, like sealpox, are rare (dashed red arrows). In Tier 3, 
zoonotic viruses have acquired the ability to be transmitted between humans without the 
contribution of the animal host. In some cases (W) a virus might leap directly to Tier 3 or 
transition through Tier 2
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